

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00
INRE-00 ACDE-00 ERDE-00 /026 W
-----030833 132054Z /73
O 132012Z DEC 77
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4016
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12058

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM US UK UR
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: DISCUSSION OF OSI AT HEADS
OF DELEGATION MEETING, DECEMBER 12

CTB MESSAGE NO. 83

1. SUMMARY. DURING RESTRICTED MEETING OF HEADS OF DELEGATION FOLLOWING DECEMBER 12 PLENARY, WARNKE EXPLORED WITH MOROKHOV BASIC ISSUES REGARDING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS (OSI). MOROKHOV EXPRESSED IN VERY STRONG TERMS SOVIET OPPOSITION TO MANDATORY OSI IN BOTH A GENERAL MULTILATERAL TREATY AND IN A SEPARATE US-USSR VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. "THIS POSITION WILL NOT CHANGE--DURING MY LIFETIME--NOT BECAUSE I OPPOSE IT, BUT BECAUSE IT IS A GRAVE MATTER OF PRINCIPLE." HE DID NOT, HOWEVER, REJECT WARNKE'S APPEALS TO SEARCH FOR WAYS TO SURMOUNT CONFLICT IN US AND SOVIET PRINCIPLES. END SUMMARY.

2. RESTRICTED MEETING BEGAN WITH CRADOCK (UK REP) ASKING
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WHETHER PACE OF PLENARY MEETINGS COULD BE ACCELERATED. MOROKHOV, RESPONDING NEGATIVELY, SAID THAT HIS DEL WAS TAKING GREAT TIME AND EFFORT TO ASK SERIOUS QUESTIONS ABOUT IMPORTANT MATERS OF PRINCIPLE. FOR EXAMPLE, IT WAS POSITION OF PRINCIPLE FOR USSR TO OPPOS THE KIND OF MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION THAT US SUGGESTED IN ITS WORKING PAPER. NEVERTHELESS, SOVIET SIDE WAS ASKING

QUESTIONS IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND FULLY THE US SUGGESTIONS BECAUSE POSSIBLY SOVIETS WERE WRONG AND THEY WANTED BEST POSSIBLE BASIS FOR FORMING THEIR RESPONSES LATER. IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR SOVIET DEL MERELY TO GIVE GREAT MANY REASONS TO SUPPORT ITS EXISTING POSITIONS, BUT IT DID NOT WANT TO DO THIS.

3. WARNKE RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH. IT WAS IMPORTANT, HOWEVER, TO DEAL WITH OTHER AREAS OF PRINCIPLE AS WELL. FOR EXAMPLE, IN AREA OF OSI, SOVIETS HAD ASSERTED PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARINESS. WE COULD SAY AS MATTER OF PRINCIPLE THAT WE CAN'T ACCEPT YOUR PRINCIPLE. WE WOULD HAVE PRINCIPLES ON BOTH SIDES BUT NO PROGRESS. AS AN EXAMPLAR OF A FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE SAID, "YOU MUST SOMETIMES RISE ABOVE PRINCIPLES." WE SHOULD TRY TO FIND PRACTICAL WAYS OF ACCOMMODATING BOTH SIDES.

4. MOROKHOV RESPONDED THAT WHEN PRINCIPLES DON'T COINCIDE, THEN YOU SHOULD RESORT TO THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE--TO TRY TO COME TOGETHER. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD CONTINUE, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, TO BE AGAINST MANDATORY OSI. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL OF A VOLUNTARY BASIS FOR OSI WAS ALREADY A RESORT TO THE TYPE OF COMPROMISE WARNKE ADVOCATED. THE US HAD INDICATED A FLEXIBLE APPROACH AND NOW WE HAVE TO FIND AN EXACT POINT OF MEETING.

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5. MOROKHOV THEN SAID THAT HE WAS BAFFLED BY OUR TWO-TRACK APPROACH ON VERIFICATION (I.E., MULTILATERAL PROCEDURES, AS WELL AS A SEPARATE AGREEMENT TO GOVERN VERIFICATION BETWEEN THE US AND USSR). IT WAS NOT CLEAR TO HIM THE LIMITS OF EACH, AND HE FEARED THEY MIGHT CRISS-CROSS. ALTHOUGH THE BILATERAL APPROACH HAD BEEN TO THE LIKING OF THE SOVIET SIDE, IT WAS NOW IMPORTANT TO FIND OUT ITS EXACT DELIMITATION. HE WOULD NOT WANT ANY ACTIVITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION OR OTHER MULTILATERAL PROCEDURES TO INTERFERE WITH THE BILATERAL TRACK. MOROKHOV ASSUMED THAT THE BILATERAL TRACK WAS VOLUNTARY. YOU COULD NOT BE FORCED TO HAVE A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH, SAY GUATEMALA. IF HE WAS RIGHT ON THIS, HE THOUGHT THAT HE AND TIMERBAEV WOULD BE POSITIVE.

6. WARNKE SAID BOTH SIDES SHOULD LOOK FOR A SOLUTION WITH FLEXIBILITY. THERE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MUCH FLEXIBILITY FROM THE SOVIET SIDE IF THERE ONLY WAS ONE SOLUTION UNDER WHICH, IN EVERY CASE, WE HAD TO SAY "MAY WE PLEASE HAVE AN INSPECTION", BUT IN EVERY CASE THE SOVIETS SAID "HELL NO". WE COULD DO THAT WELL WITH NO PROVISION IN A TREATY. THIS RESULT WOULD NOT ONLY BE CONSISTENT WITH THE PRIN-

CIPLE OF VOLUNTARINESS, BUT ALSO THE PRINCIPLE OF
ARBITRARINESS. THE COMPROMISE WE NEED TO STRIKE SHOULD
NOT INVOLVE THE PRINCIPLE OF ARBITRARINESS. THE TWO-TRACK
SYSTEM COULD HELP US HERE. BY CONCENTRATING ON THE SYSTEM
WE NEED FOR OURSELVES WE COULD ACHIEVE A RESULT IN THE
BILATERAL AGREEMENT THAT MIGHT NOT BE POSSIBLE IF WE WERE
HAVING A SINGLE APPROACH IN A MULTILATERAL TREATY. THE
BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS WOULD BE BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL COUN-
TRIES HAVING SPECIAL INTERESTS AND SECURITY RELATIONS.

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 12058
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THE US-SOVIET AGREEMENT WOULD NOT CREATE A PRECEDENT
REQUIRING SEPARATE AGREEMENTS WITH OTHERS. IF GUATEMALA
APPROACHED US TO WORK OUT A BILATERAL VERIFICATION AGREE-
MENT, WE WOULD CERTAINLY SAY NO.

7. MOROKHOV SAID THIS WAS A VERY USEFUL EXPLANATION OF
US POSITION. HE WISHED TO CLARIFY THE SOVIET POSITION
FURTHER. EVEN IN THE CONTEXT OF BILATERAL VERIFICATION
AGREEMENT, SOVIETS COULD STILL NOT ACCEPT MANDATORY NATURE
OF OSI. WE COULD WORK OUT PRINCIPLES FOR SUCH VERIFI-
CATION; WE COULD WORK OUT THE RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS OF
INSPECTORS; WE COULD ACCEPT THE NECESSITY FOR SOME CRI-
TERIA; BUT MOROKHOV WAS ABSOLUTELY CONVINCED--AND THERE
SHOULD BE NO ILLUSION--THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT
AGREE TO MANDATORY OSI. THIS WAS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE
AND THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF A CHANGE REGARDING THIS
IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

8. OF COURSE, MOROKHOV CONTINUED, NECESSITY MIGHT ARISE
FOR INSPECTIONS TO PROVE THAT SUSPICIOUS EVENTS WERE NOT
EXPLOSIONS AND THE SOVIET UNION THEN WOULD VOLUNTARILY

INVITE INSPECTORS. HE SAID HE COULD ENVISION SUCH CASES
AND WAS SURE SUCH CASES COULD OCCUR TO ENHANCE CONFIDENCE.
BUT IT IS UNREALISTIC TO EXPECT MANDATORY INSPECTIONS TO
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BE WRITTEN INTO A TREATY. "THIS POSITION WOULD NOT
CHANGE--DURING MY LIFETIME--NOT BECAUSE I OPPOSE IT, BUT
BECAUSE IT IS A GRAVE MATTER OF PRINCIPLE." WE MUST LOOK
FOR OTHER APPROACHES. MOROKHOV THEN ASKED WHETHER WE
ENVISIONED PROVISIONS ON THIS SUBJECT WRITTEN IN THE
TREATY OR IN OTHER FORMS, OR IN A "GENTLEMEN'S AGREEMENT."

9. WARNKE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE LESS THAN CANDID IF HE
DID NOT POINT OUT THAT IN HIS COUNTRY PEOPLE DON'T UNDER-
STAND THE REASON FOR THE SOVIET POSITION AND FEEL THAT
MANDATORY OSI'S ARE DESIRABLE, EVEN ESSENTIAL. PEOPLE
ESPECIALLY COULD NOT ACCEPT THAT AN ARBITRARY REFUSAL TO
HAVE AN OSI WOULD BE JUSTIFIED. WARNKE SUGGESTED IT
WOULD BE MAKING A MISTAKE TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM SOLELY
IN TERMS OF MANDATORY VERSUS VOLUNTARY INSPECTIONS. IN
THE FINAL ANALYSIS, NO SOVEREIGN STATE COULD BE KEPT FROM
SAYING "NO" AND EQUALLY A REQUESTING STATE COULD NOT BE
FORCED TO BE SATISFIED WITH ACCEPTING "NO" FOR AN ANSWER.
A NEGATIVE ANSWER TO A VALID REQUEST WOULD ENHANCE SUS-
PICION AND UNDERMINE THE TREATY. OUR TASK HERE SHOULD BE
TO RECONCILE PRINCIPLES AND TO RECOGNIZE REALITIES.

10. MOROKHOV CONCLUDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE STOOD FOR THE
PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARINESS IN THE SENSE THAT EVERYONE
SHOULD BE CONFIDENT THE TREATY IS BEING OBSERVED. OUR
TASK IS TO WORK OUT THE FORM. THE SOVIET SIDE IS ALSO
AGAINST ARBITRARINESS.

11. THE MEETING THEN TURNED TO PLANS FOR SESSIONS OF THE
WORKING GROUPS, AND IT WAS AGREED THAT BOTH THE POLITICAL
AND TECHNICAL WORKING GROUPS WOULD MEET ON TUESDAY,
DECEMBER 13. WARNKE

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